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NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff and Respondent Stan Katz, requests that this
Court affirm a final order of the trial court denying Appellant's
Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judqment entered on the
26th day of Auqust, 1985 in the Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows:
1.

Whether the refusal of the trial court to grant

Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment
constitutes an abuse of discretion.
2.

Whether Appellants may raise for the first time on
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appeal evidentiary matters not raised before the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's Complaint seeking recovery of installment
contract arrearages under a Uniform Real Estate Contract plus
court costs and attorney's fees was filed on March 14, 1985.
(R2)
Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce were
served with Summons and Complaint on March 30, 1985.

(R7, RIO)

The Summons provided for thirty days in which to answer, because
two of the Defendants, Kent S. Larson and Ruby Larson, resided out
of the state.
Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce delivered
the Summons and Complaint to their counsel, Andrew B. Berry, Jr.,
on April 15, 19R5. (R33)
Despite several telephone conversations between counsel
prior to and through April 17, 1985, defense counsel Andrew Berry
never requested any extension of the time in which to file an
Answer.

(R40)
By letter dated April 22, 1985 (R43), received by

Defendant's counsel on April 23, 1985 (R33), Plaintiff's counsel
informed Defendant's counsel that an Entry of Default and Default
Judgment would be submitted if no Answer was filed by April 20,
1985. (R43)
The Entry of Default was actually submitted on Aoril 30,
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1985f and executed the same day (R13), 31 days from the date of
service upon Defendants.
Plaintiff's Default Judqment was submitted and executed on
May 17, 1985 (R16, R17).
Defendant's Answer was finally filed on May 30, 1985
(R18), 55 days after the Complaint was delivered by Defendants to
their counsel,

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In circumstances where:
a.

no request for an extension of time in which to
file and answer is made, and

b.

counsel is told in writing that a default will be
taken unless an answer is filed before a date
certain, and

c.

no Answer is filed within the statutory time
period, or within the extended time period
(thirty days) stated in the Summons,

it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to
set aside the default and default judqment.
Where the Appellant elects not to rely on a transcript of
the lower court proceedings, there is a presumption that
sufficient evidence was introduced to sustain the judqment.

More

important, the Appellant is not entitled to raise for the first
time on appeal matters not raised before the trial court.
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT TO SET ASIDE THE
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION REQUIRING REVERSAL BY THIS COURT.
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
refuse to set aside the Default and Default Judgment under the
factual circumstances present here.
No substantial disoute exists as to the chronology of
events which led to the entry of Default and Default Judqment
against Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce.

The

Pierces were served the Summons and Complaint on March 30f 1985.
Because the two remaining Defendants, Kent S. Larson and Ruby
Larson resided out of the state, the Summons provided for 30 days
in which to answer.

(R7, RIO)

The Pierces delivered the Summons

and Complaint to their counsel, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., on April 5,
1985.

(R33)
Despite several telephone conversations between Andrew

Berry and Raymond Scott Berry, counsel for Plaintiff, Defendant's
counsel never requested any extension of the time in which to file
an Answer. (R40)
By letter dated April 22, 1985, (R43), counsel for
Plaintiff informed counsel for the Defendants that an Entry of
Default and Default Judqment would be entered if an Answer was not
filed by April 20, 1985. (R43)
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The Entry of Default was actually not submitted until
April 30, 1985.

Tt was executed by the court the same day. (R13)

On April 30, 1985, 31 days had elapsed from the date of service
upon Defendants Pierces.
The Default Judgment was not submitted and executed until
May 17, 1985 (R16, R17).
The Answer of Defendants was finally filed on May 30, 1985
(R18), 55 days after the Complaint was delivered by the Pierces to
their counsel.
Subsequently within the time specified bv URCP 60(b),
Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment, citing
URCP 55(c) and 60(b).

The Motion to Set Aside the Default and

Default Judgment states that the default "judgment previously
entered should be set aside "on the qround that counsel for each
of the parties were engaged in negotiation."

(R36)

Motions for relief under URCP 60(b) mav not be granted
unless specific factual showings are made.

Specifically, under

URCP 60(b)(1), there must be a showing of "mistake, inadvertance,
surprise, or excusable neglect?".
The question then becomes whether the "negotiations"
referred to by Defendants in their Motion to Set Aside the Default
constitute mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect.
Counsel for Appellant has cited no authority in support of
the proposition that negotiations, if actually occurring, are
grounds for relief under URCP 60(b).
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More to the point, the

communications referred to as "negotiations" by counsel for
Appelants could be eaually well described as discussions.

In

their respective Affidavits filed in support of and in opposition
to the Motion to Set Aside the Default, counsel characterized
those communications differently.

Presumably, it is within the

discretion of the trial court to determine which characterization
was the most accurate.

The exercise of discretion is not

synonymous with an abuse of discretion, as Appellants seem to
maintain.
The law in this -jurisdiction relatinq to the standard of
review on the refusal of a trial court to set aside a default
judgment is well settled.

The recent case of Airkem

Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973),
contains the most recent succinct expression of that standard.

In

that opinion, this court states:
For thi's court to overturn the discretion of
the lower court in refusinq to vacate a valid
judgment, the requirements of public policy demand
more than a mere statement that a person did not
have his day in court when full opportunity for a
fair hearing was afforded to him or his legal
representative. The movant must show that he used
due diligence and that he was precluded from
appearing by circumstances over which he had no
control. (Citation omitted, emphasis in original)
In denying the Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Default
Judgment, the trial court in effect determined that Defendants
have not used due diligence and that they were not prevented from
appearing by circumstances over which they had no control.

That

conclusion is totally consistent with the factual chronology.
-6-

The undisputed history establishes that despite
discussions between counsel, counsel for the Appellants never at
any time reguested an extension of the time period in which to
answer. (R40)

Second, the record establishes that on April 22,

1985, counsel for Defendants was informed in writing that a
default would be taken unless an Answer was timely filed. (R43)
Despite that warning, no Answer was filed, and on April 30, 1985,
the default of the Defendants was actually submitted and entered.
These undisputed facts persuaded the trial court that
Defendants had not exercised due diligence, and that they were
not prevented from appearing by circumstances over which they had
no control, the test cited in Airkem Tntermountain, Inc. v.
Parker.
That conclusion is consistent with the previous ruling of
this court set forth in Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373
P2d 573 (1962).

In that action, after entry of a default judgment

in favor of Plaintiff, the Defendant moved to set aside the
default on the grounds of inadvertance and excusable neglect.

The

Motion was denied, and the Defendant appealed.
The Affidavit filed in support of the Motion to Set Aside
stated that the attorney for the Defendant thought he had filed an
Answer but had mistakenly not done so.

However, evidence

presented by the Plaintiff in opposition to the Motion and
accepted bv the trial court established that several days before
the default judgment was reguested, the attorney then representing
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the Plaintiff called Defendant's attorney to the fact that the
matter was in default and that a default judgment would be taken
unless somethinq was done.

On those factors, the action of the

trial court was sustained*
The case presented here is similar in that seven days
before the entry of default was submitted and entered, Plaintiff's
counsel informed Defendant in writing that a default would be
taken unless a timely Answer was filed.

Under the circumstances,

a substantial imaginative step would be required before it could
reasonably be concluded that counsel for Appellants was misled or
surprised by the submission and entry of the Default Certificate,
In conclusion, Defendants failed before the trial court to
make any showing of mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable
neglect which would justify relief from the judgment actually
entered, and the trial court so found.

The trial court apparently

was not persuaded that "negotiations" reasonably excused
Defendants from their obligation to file a timely response,
particularly when those "negotiations" did not involve any reguest
for an extension of time in which to answer and where Defendant's
counsel was warned in writing that a default would be taken if no
timely Answer was filed.
The decision of the trial court does not exhibit an abuse
of discretion that would justify reversal.

To the contrary, the

trial court's decision exhibits an exercise of discretion
consistent with the controlling principles adopted by this court
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Under these circumstances, where there exists an
unrebutted presumption that the judgment was supported by adequate
evidence, and where the complaint regarding the failure to hold an
evidentiary hearing is raised for the first time on appeal, it
would be improper for this court to reverse the trial court's
judgment on the grounds suggested by Defendants.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff resoectfully submits that the Entry of Judqment
of which Defendants complain was done within the sound discretion
of the trial court, consistent with the controlling law and basic
considerations of fair play.

Appellants have not cited any

authority supporting their claim that "negotiations" toll the time
period in which an Answer is reguired.

Appellants have failed to

offer any basis for a finding that they were prevented from filing
a timely Answer by circumstances beyond their control.

The

decision of the trial court should be sustained.
At the trial court level, Respondent was awarded costs and
attorney's fees based on a contractual provision.

On appeal,

Respondent similarly requests that it be awarded its reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred by this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this , ^>

day of March, 1986.

GREEN & BERRY

t j Aw \_h^y
Raymond Scott Berry /)
Attorney for Plainti-if/Respondent
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